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Summary: The Institute of Transportation Systems (IFS) of the German Aerospace 
Center (DLR) is engaged in research regarding technical as well as operational 
safety and human factors in railways. The aim is to develop a model of safety layers 
(MoSiS – Modell der Sicherheits-Schichten) in the railway system to make safety 
scaleable. With this model of safety layers it will be possible to look at the safety of 
a railway system in a modular way. This contribution presents the basic approach to 




 The IFS researches new possibilities to improve efficiency and 
performance of railway lines while maintaining the existing high level of 
safety. These two aims are somehow contradictory. Observations show that 
high performance systems have more safety gaps than those with a high 
level of safety but low performance. The more restrictive safety is dealt 
with the more performance the system will loose. More permissive 
regulations give better performance but might decrease safety. 
 Increasing requirements for the development of new products 
(faster, cost-effective, more variants etc.) make it more and more difficult to 
comply with all safety constraints and to prove the safety of systems. On the 
other hand the railway system has reached a very high level of technical 
safety: Today less than 1 % of all accidents with damage to persons are 
caused by technical failures during normal operation [1]. In spite of that we 
still have a high number of accidents that occur at a particular part of the 
railway system: the level crossing (see fig. 1) [2]. 
 Level crossings are often a cause of decreasing performance. They 
often imply a constraint on safety, too, particularly in degraded modes of 
operation. This is the source of motivation for developing a model that aids 
                                                     
1e-mail: markus.pelz@dlr.de, phone: +49 531 295 3483; fax: +49 531 295 3402;  
German Aerospace Center, Institute of Transportation Systems, Lilienthalplatz 7,  
38108 Braunschweig, Germany 
2e-mail: stefanie.schwartz@dlr.de, phone: +49 531 295 3444; fax: +49 531 295 3402 
3e-mail: michael.meyerzuhoerste@dlr.de, phone: +49 531 295 3440; fax: +49 531 295 3402 
  
in showing that safety can be improved by using low cost technology, 
available at the market, together with appropriate process instructions. 
 
Fig.1. Level crossing with barriers 
 Improving safety usually means spending a lot of money. One of 
the reasons for this is the existing high level of safety – a lot of measures 
have already been taken. Another reason is the trend to use components 
suitable for SIL 4 applications regardless of the actually needed SIL (Safety 
Integrity Level [3]). There are attempts to get away from these very 
expensive components, to use components suitable only for SIL 2 or SIL 3 
applications instead – without decreasing safety.  
 Regarding these components – in combination with rules and 
operating procedures – there are two problems that need to be solved: First, 
the gaps in the existing safety system need to be identified, so it becomes 
clear what needs to be done to improve safety. Second, it needs to be shown 
that the new solution really does ensure the required level of safety. The 
model of safety layers (MoSiS) shall help with both of these problems. 
 
 
2. Terms and Definitions  
 To develop a model that shows the flaws of the existing safety 
system we need to know how it comes to accidents. Which are the critical 
situations, the component failures, the human errors, the unobserved rules? 
We need to do accident analysis. From the result of this analysis we build 
our model. Which methods and models we use for that will be explained in 
the next paragraphs. 
 
 
2.1. Safety Layers  
 Safety layers are used in several areas. In computer science a safety 
layer describes a mechanism that aims at detecting errors in communication. 
The term is also used for a part of an application that checks the access 
authorisation of communicating processes [4]. Medical science uses the 
similar term “layers of defence”. These layers are often illustrated in form 
of the so-called Swiss cheese model (see chapter 2.2.). 
 For our purpose of building MoSiS a safety layer is a combination 
of technology and procedures, of components, rules and persons that are 
considered as an interrelated entity, represented by one layer. A 
combination of different safety layers leads to a safety concept for the 
system under consideration (see fig. 2).  
 
Fig.2. Safety concept built of safety layers with influencing factors 
 A system is considered to be safe as long as its safety layers block 
or at least weaken any errors or hazards that threaten the system. No 
accident should happen until every single safety layer of the system has 
been broken. If an accident happens this can have several reasons: 
− The safety layer failed. 
− The safety layer was circumvented or sabotaged. 
− The system was used outside its operating parameters. 
− A safety layer was missing. 
 There can be very good reasons for running a system without a 
specific safety layer. The layer could be far too expensive, even impossible 
to design and the remaining risk simply acceptable. 
 
 
2.2. Swiss Cheese Model 
 Usually it takes more than one single failure to cause an accident. 
Especially where the existing level of safety is high a combination of 
several failures is needed so that it comes to an accident. To illustrate this 
James Reason developed the LOP-Model (LOP = “layers of protection”), 
also known as “Swiss cheese model” [5]. The name Swiss cheese model 
comes from the fact that every layer of protection has weaknesses, gaps, 
through which hazards can enter the system. These gaps can best be 
illustrated by holes in a slice of cheese (see fig. 3). 
 
Fig.3. Layers of protection according to the Swiss cheese model  
 Reason’s Swiss cheese model is the starting point for the 
development of MoSiS. It is essential that the development of a model of 
safety layers starts with the identification of the flaws of the railway system. 
 
 
2.3. Accident Analysis 
 First, it is necessary to find out why it comes to an accident, e. g. at 
a level crossing. This is done by accident analysis. The analysis gives us the 
reasons behind the accident, the relevant situations, involved components, 
involved persons and applicable operational rules. Accident analysis 
methods, for example from aviation, are applied to railway accidents and 
incidents. One analysis method already used in the railway sector is the 
Why-Because Analysis (WBA) of Peter Ladkin [6].  
 For a WBA one starts with the accident and then asks for the 
causal factors that contributed to that accident. An especially nice feature of 
this method is the graphical representation of the analysis. The accident and 
its contributing causal factors are illustrated by a Why-Because Graph 
(WBG). WBGs have an easy to understand format, suitable for discussion 
among different stakeholders. For an example of a WBG see fig. 4. 
 
Fig.4. Example of a Why-Because Graph 
3. MoSiS: Model of Safety Layers in the Railway System 
 By means of MoSiS (the model of safety layers that is currently 
under development at IFS) it shall be possible to look at the safety of the 
railway system in a modular way. It shall assist in creating a custom-built, 
cost-effective safety concept. The aim is to reduce costs, compared to 
current status, and thus to increase the cost effectiveness of the railway 
system without neglecting safety. MoSiS is also expected to be helpful for 
building safety cases. 
 To build a model of safety layers a sufficiently large accident 
database is needed. When building this database it is important to take an 
appropriate sample of accidents. That means one should always investigate 
more than one accident of a type (e. g. level crossings accidents or 
derailments). 
 It is practically infeasible to build a model of safety layers of the 
whole railway system all at once. We need a starting point, a small, well-
defined subsystem. It needs to be a subsystem where (in a statistical sense) a 
sufficiently large number of accidents occur. According to Eurostat [7] 
17 % of all railway accidents in the EU in 2005 happened at level crossings. 
So, a level crossing could be a good subsystem to start with (see fig. 5). 
 
Fig.5. Expanding MoSiS from starting point level crossing 
 After choosing the starting point the following tasks have to be 
performed: 
− Accident analysis (e. g. using WBA) 
− Identification of flaws in the subsystem 
− Construction of safety layers 
 From here we can build the model of safety layers for the chosen 
subsystem, using Reason’s Swiss cheese model as a basis. To get alternative 
safety concepts for the subsystem the next steps will be: 
− Close the gaps in the safety layers 
− Add new safety layers 
− Exchange safety layers  
− Recombination the existing safety layers. 
3.1. Accident Analysis and Existing Safety Layers 
 The collected accident data need to be analysed in a structured 
way. To stick to the example: We will select a reasonable number of level 
crossing accidents from the database and perform WBAs for all of them. 
The WBAs will give us the causal factors that led to those accidents. Every 
causal factor provides an indication of a flaw in the level crossing 
subsystem. From these flaws we start to construct the existing safety layers. 
Every flaw is a gap in a safety layer. So, when we found a flaw, we know 
there has to exist a safety layer around it. Using the Swiss cheese model for 
illustration this approach can be described as shown in fig. 6. 
 
Fig.6. Description of holes in the safety layers by means of WBA 
 It would be illusory to believe that we could find every gap and 
every safety layer just by looking at accidents. Accident analysis tells us 
about safety layers that have already failed in the past only. Safety layers 
that have never been broken don’t appear in this approach. We need to 
complete the results from accident analysis with a system analysis. 
 
 
3.2. New Safety Layers and Recombination 
 Absolute safety is impossible to reach. Every concept, every layer 
will have gaps. Instead of spending a lot of effort, time and money on the 
attempt to close the existing gaps it can be much better to develop a new 
safety layer that itself has a lot of gaps, but elsewhere. The required level of 
safety is reached by combination of those layers. 
 New layers like these can be added to MoSiS. The more different 
layers we know the more comprehensive the portfolio of safety layers will 
become. A good portfolio offers a wide range of possibilities: New safety 
layers can be added to an existing safety concept in order to improve safety. 
Safety concepts can be optimised by exchanging some of the safety layers 
already in place with others that are more (cost) effective. This will be a 
great benefit especially for low-density railway lines. For completely new 
systems one can choose an optimal combination of safety layers right from 
the beginning. The better this portfolio the easier it will become to construct 




3.3. Expected Benefit and Problems 
 MoSiS is expected to provide the following benefits: 
− Identification of flaws in the railway system 
− Modelling of safety layers 
− Possibility to add, to exchange and to recombine safety layers 
− Possibility to optimise the safety concept in order to reduce costs  
− Possibility to improve safety 
 Though the concept of safety layers will give us deep insight into 
the railway system and offers great possibilities it cannot offer perfect 
safety. Safety layers might be influenced from outside the system or simply 
wear out and thereby get new gaps. Common cause failures can weaken 
several safety layers at the same time or open new gaps all in a row. 
 There is evidence that the reliability of a safety layer depends on 
the protection by other layers in front of it. This effect is often observed in 
modes of degraded operation: A staff member, reliable during normal 




 In the full-scale state MoSiS will include the functions of its safety 
layers. It will be possible to compare existing and new safety concepts for 
the railway system. New cost-efficient safety systems, e. g. for level 
crossings, can be developed and compared with existing solutions. The 
advantage of MoSiS is the ability to show on a qualitative level, whether a 
new solution will eliminate only a specific safety flaw or improve the 
overall safety level. It can be used as a kind of “library” of safety layers as 
well as a kind of validation environment.  
 Used in the right way MoSiS can help to use new and existing 
safety layers in an efficient way or at least to identify precisely the required 
characteristics of a new safety layer.  
5. Conclusion  
 The railway system is one of the safest transport systems we have. 
It usually takes more than one failure to cause an accident. Nevertheless we 
should improve the safety of the railway system where it is possible, 
reasonable and affordable. A systematic accident analysis is an adequate 
starting point for this task. Structured analysis methods like WBA help us 
finding causal factors of accidents instead of the culprit. Causal factors of 
accidents are flaws in the safety of a system. They lead us to gaps in safety 
layers and from there to the safety layers themselves which form the model 
of safety layers in the railway system (MoSiS). MoSiS reflects the fact that 
we usually have more than one causal factor of an accident: Before it comes 
to an accident several safety layers need to break. 
 The development of MoSiS starts with a subsystem (like a level 
crossing) and from there the model will be expanded until it covers the 
whole railway system. The main benefits of the model of safety layers are 
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